CEO career horizons and earnings quality in family firms by Che Ahmad, Ayoib et al.
CEO career horizons and earnings
quality in family firms
Ayoib B. Che-Ahmad, Salau Olarinoye Abdulmalik and
Nor Zalina Mohamad Yusof
Tunku Puteri Intan Safinaz School of Accountancy, College of Business,
Universiti Utara Malaysia, Sintok, Malaysia
Abstract
Purpose – The present study examines the effect of the chief executive officer (CEO) career horizon (CH)
problem on earnings quality (ERN) for selected family-controlled firms known to have a unique
operational goal.
Design/methodology/approach – The generalised method of moment linear regression model was used on
a sample of family-controlled firms in Malaysia from 2005 to 2016.
Findings –The study found a negative relationship between CH and ERN, measured by earnings persistence
and earnings predictability. However, in the earnings predictability model, the reverse was found to be the case
after interacting CH with CEO family affiliation, CEO experience and CEO equity. However, the use of a
reputable auditor could not mitigate the CH problem. Also, the study obtained a closely related result in the
earnings persistence model. The result aligns with the socio-emotional wealth (SEW) theory, which states that
the goals of family-controlled firms go beyond financial objectives to include other non-financial objectives, and
hence, their commitment to perpetuating their dynasty encourages them to preserve the quality of their
earnings.
Originality/value – Existing studies on family firms and ERN have treated family firms as homogeneous
entities by comparing family and non-family firms, using the underlying theoretical justification of the agency
theory. However, this study departs from the agency theory, by considering those factors (i.e. the extent of CEO
alignment with family owners and the choice of auditor), using the SEW theory, which establishes the
differences among family firms. This work builds on that of Chen et al., (2018) and Ali and Zhang (2015), which
suggested that corporate governance can mitigate the CH problem. Therefore, the strength of a CEO’s
attachment to the family firm (measured by CEO equity ownership and CEO affiliation to family members in
family firms) and the choice of the auditor can explain the variation in the effect of the CH problem in
family firms.
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1. Introduction
It is impossible to overstate the importance of reporting high-quality financial figures in firms
where there is a separation between the ownership andmanagement of the firm. According to
the agency theory framework, the divergence of interests caused by the separation of equity
ownership and control of a firm creates information asymmetry, which then results in
managers pursuing self-interest goals (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Mustapha and Che-
Ahmad, 2011). Annually, a manager renders a stewardship report to the equity owners, who
then utilise the account to evaluate the performance of the manager and reward him/her
accordingly. In many instances, information asymmetries between the equity owners and the
manager can create the incentive for themanager to pursue earnings aggressively, whichwill
consequently reduce the quality of the reported figures. Therefore, both academics and
policymakers have acknowledged that a robust corporate governance mechanism is a
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Consistent with the agency theory argument, the significant control exercised over managers
in family-controlled firms can result in interest alignment between the equity owners and the
managers, which can subsequently minimise the agency problem. By implication, there is an
improvement in the quality of reported earnings, because there is a reduction in the incentive
of managers to manage earnings. However, the concentration of equity ownership in the
hands of a few individuals could create a severe “Type II” agency problem (Arowolo and Che-
Ahmad, 2016; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). A Type II agency problem arises when a few
individuals hold most of the equity of the company, which allows them to control the firm’s
strategic direction and to favour themselves at the expense of the minority shareholders.
Matta and Beamish (2008) documented a heightened agency problem, otherwise referred
to as the CEO career horizon (CH) problem, when CEOs are newly appointed or nearing
retirement. The CH problem occurs when both newly appointed CEOs with a long CH and
CEOs nearing their retirement make decisions that satisfy their immediate short-term
interests. For example, such CEOs will favour short-term, less risky decisions compared to
long-term strategic decisions (Strike et al., 2015). Ali and Zhang (2015) concluded that the
desire of a newly appointed CEO to improve market perceptions is motivated by the need to
gain several long-term benefits, such as reappointment, higher compensation andmanagerial
autonomy. Furthermore, a CEO nearing retirement will aim to inflate retirement earnings-
based compensation and maximise post-retirement benefits (Strike et al., 2015). Accordingly,
the CHproblem can have severe consequences for the quality of financial reporting, because it
can create the incentive for CEOs to deliberately distort reported earnings and stock price
(Liang et al., 2017). Prior studies (Ali and Zhang, 2015; Chen et al., 2018) have focussed
predominantly on agency theory to establish the effect of the CH problem on reporting
quality. Therefore, it would be interesting to investigate how the heterogeneity within family-
controlled firms affects the CH and the reported earnings quality (ERN) using the socio-
emotional wealth (SEW) theory. The SEW theory shows how the non-financial goals of
family firms, in addition to their financial goals, influence the nature of their reports (Berrone
et al., 2012).
The CH problem has been discussed widely in corporate governance literature. Chen et al.
(2018) investigated the effect of CH on conditional accounting conservatism and found it to be
moderated by corporate governance and so consistent with the agency theory. Despite the
argument that a CEO, nearing retirement, has fewer incentives to take strategic business
decisions in the interest of shareholders, it was found that strong corporate governance
mitigates the effects of this situation (Chen et al., 2018). The finding is consistent with the view
that the board of directors and other senior executives could ameliorate the CH problem.
Cheng (2004) andHuson et al. (2011) stated that when the compensation committee is aware of
the CH problem, it can discourage disadvantageous practices by adjusting the compensation
plan of the CEO. The findings that robust corporate governancemechanisms canmitigate the
CH problemmay be extended to family firms, because prior studies of family-controlled firms
have shown that the desire to perpetuate the stream of economic benefits obtained in a family-
controlled firm beyond the current generation supersedes the economic motives of
establishing the firm. As argued in the SEW theory, family-controlled firms are risk-
averse to any strategic decision or action that will erode their SEW. Despite the big
differences between family-controlled and non-family controlled firms, only Strike et al. (2015)
have investigated the CH problem in family-controlled firms in the context of ERN. Therefore,
there is a need for a study that examines the effects of the CH problem on ERN in a family-
controlled firm. Given this, the first objective of this study is to examine the association
between a CEO’s CH and ERN in a family-controlled firm.
Malaysia is an ideal country for this kind of study because of its high proportion of family-
controlled firms (Abdul Rahman and Haneem Mohamed Ali, 2006; Amran and Che-Ahmad,




seventh among the countries with the highest number of family-controlled business (CSRI,
2019). Some of the family-controlled businesses that started as small business enterprises
have turned into large conglomerates and are competing at the international level (Ibrahim
and Samad, 2010). For example, globally, the Press Metal Company and Genting Hong Kong
(a member of the Malaysia Genting group) were ranked 49th and 29th, respectively, in terms
of revenue growth (CSRI, 2019). Additionally, some family-controlled firms in Malaysia have
moved from the first generation to the third or fourth generations. Family members, or
individuals close to family members, dominate the board of directors and the top level of the
management hierarchy in those types of companies. The available evidence indicates that
Malaysia presents a unique case study, because family-controlled firms have maintained
substantial control over a long period.
Similarly, concern has grown about the quality of reported figures, owing partly to
reported cases of breakdowns in corporate governance among some Malaysian listed
companies that have had a negative effect on reporting quality. These include: Transmile
Group BHD1, Megan Media Holdings BHD, DIS Technology Holdings BHD and SCAN
Associates BHD (Online Star, 2010). The 2006 unaudited report of Transmile Group showed
an 80% jump in revenue. However, the companywas found to have overstated its revenue for
the financial years 2004–2006 by RM622 Million (Online Star, 2010). Megan Media Holdings
was found to have misled the Securities Commissions and the stock exchange, Bursa
Malaysia (formerly known as the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange), by inflating revenue by
RM1 billion in its 2006 financial statements (Online Star, 2010). These instances of misleading
corporate reports by the management of Transmile Group and Megan Media Holdings
occurred despite corporate governance reforms and so drew attention to issues related to the
quality of reported earnings. Al-dhamari et al. (2012) stated that the quality of reported
earnings remains a significant concern among investors, because the ability of the board to
enhance the quality of those reports remains debatable. In the past, ineffective boards, weak
enforcement and compliance, poor disclosure quality and shoddy audit work all contributed
to the various reported financial scandals. Although several empirical studies have examined
the association between earnings quality and the CH problem, only a few (e.g. Chen et al.,
2018; Ali and Zhang, 2015) have focussed on the developed capital market. Furthermore,
many of the extant studies of family-controlled firms have focusedmainly on comparing how
the differences in the non-financial goals of non-family and family-controlled firms affect the
quality of a financial report.
Consequently, research is lacking into the relationship between the CH problem and
reported ERN in an emerging market within the family-controlled firm population.
Furthermore, no literature seems to have examined how certain variables will contribute
to the degree of CEO loyalty towards preserving the SEW of family-controlled firms.
Therefore, based on the highlighted gaps in the literature, there is a need for evidence from an
emergingmarketwhere the capital market is still evolving. This current research is necessary
because the result of previous studies might lack generalisability, due to weak market
mechanisms and ownership concentration in the context of family-controlled firms. Similarly,
the difference in the governance environment, which the majority of studies have noted, will
have varying effects upon the efficiency of corporate governance in different countries.
Malaysia provides a unique opportunity to conduct novel research into CH and reported
ERN, using a sample of family-controlled firms. The intrinsic characteristics of family-
controlled firms, as revealed in previous literature, lessen the tenet of traditional agency
theory. Consistent with the SEW theory, family-controlled firms are likely to display a high
level of compliance with corporate governance codes and disclosure practices, because their
ultimate goal is to ensure the perpetual succession of the family business to future
generations. Consequently, the present study argues that the CHproblem in family-controlled





CEO experience; (3) CEO equity participation; and (4) type of auditor. Therefore, this study
examines whether or not the affiliation of the CEO with family members, CEO experience,
CEO equity participation and type of auditor mitigate the CH problem.
The rest of the study is structured as follows: Section 2 contains a review of the previous
literature relating to the research, underpinning theories and hypotheses development.
Section 3 outlines the research methodology employed. Section 4 discusses the data analysis
procedure and findings. Section 5 presents the summary, conclusions and the contributions
and limitations of the study.
2. Literature review and hypotheses development
2.1 The socio-emotional wealth (SEW) theory
The SEW theory challenges the notion that family-controlled firms have heightened agency
problems compared to non-family-controlled firms, as propounded by some agency theorists.
The SEW theory posits the differences between the two theories and the rationales for such a
difference between family-controlled firms and non-family-controlled firms (Berrone et al.,
2012). According to the proponents of the SEW theory (Gomez-mejıa et al., 2007), other (non-
economic) goals are the incentive of family-controlled firms. These non-economic goals
include the desire to gain a favourable corporate reputation (identity), the ability to exercise
family influence, financial independence and family harmony through the perpetuation of a
family dynasty beyond the current generation (Gomez-mejıa et al., 2007).
Driven by the objectives mentioned earlier, family-controlled firms will only accept
significant risks to the extent that such risks do not threaten their SEW. Accordingly, the
consciousness of families relative to their SEWdoes not necessarily affect the performance of
the family firm or lead to heightened agency problems (Chrisman et al., 2004). In fact, in the
event of any perceived or established threat to a family’s SEW, such a threat is confronted by
taking strategic decisions, even when such decisions do not align with the interests of other
stakeholders (Strike et al., 2015). Therefore, the main difference between the traditional
agency theory and the SEW theory is that family-controlled firms are more risk-averse to
their SEW than to financial loss (Berrone et al., 2012).
2.2 The career horizon (CH) theory
The CH theory has its roots in the agency theory. According to the CH theory, CEOs who are
at the beginning or approaching the end of their stay in office have goals that may not
necessarily align with those of the owners. Prior studies have reported that CEOs nearing
retirement, or at the beginning of their careers, have fewer incentives to work in the interests
of the shareholders (Ali and Zhang, 2015; Davidson et al., 2007). In both situations such CEOs
are more likely to make business decisions that are consistent with their own short-term
interests, rather than making decisions that meet the long-term interests of the shareholders.
The reason for such action is that CEOs are often judged and rewarded by the managerial
labour market according to their recent past performance.
Therefore, CEOs approaching retirement would want to strengthen their market
credibility in order to improve their post-retirement benefits (Davidson et al., 2007),
maximise their post-retirement opportunities (Brickley et al., 1999; Hitt and Tyler, 1999) and
inflate their retirement earnings compensation (Antia et al., 2010). Newly appointed CEOs are
focussedmore on improving their credibility in the managerial market by influencingmarket
perceptions about their ability. A favourablemarket perception is a valuable asset for a newly
appointed CEO, because it will improve his/her long-term benefits, which include higher pay,
recognition and managerial autonomy (Ali and Zhang, 2015). The CH problem can have a




implication, on the financial reporting process. This is because CEOs (either newly appointed
or nearing retirement), whose performance does not meet managerial market perceptions,
would be tempted to positively influence such market performance through aggressive
reporting (Liang et al., 2017). Chen et al. (2018) suggested that the issue of CHmotivates a CEO
to manage accounting earnings upward to increase his/her compensation.
The CH problem has been the subject of empirical research, in the context of both R&D
cuts and managing accruals, but the results have been inconclusive (Chen et al., 2018). In the
context of R&D spending, two studies (Barker III andMueller, 2002; Dechow and Sloan, 1999)
found that CEOs nearing retirement reduce the amount spent on R&D. The motive for such
reductions is to increase a firm’s profitability during the last days of a CEO’s tenure in office,
even though such actions will most likely reduce profits in subsequent years after the CEO’s
departure. However, other studies (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992; Murphy and Zimmerman,
1993) did not find any evidence to suggest that a CEO nearing retirement manipulated R&D
spending. In the context of accrual earnings management, some studies (e.g. Ali and Zhang,
2015; Reitenga and Tearney, 2003) found that the CH problem could incentivise CEOs to
manage earnings upwards, because this would increase their current and post-retirement
pay. However, such an effect can be attenuated by strong corporate governance (Ali and
Zhang, 2015). Both Cheng (2004) and Huson et al. (2011) reported that, when the remuneration
committee is conscious of the CH problem, it will constrain the CEO from engaging in such
behaviour. Conclusively, the prevailing view across the literature is that the CH problem
makes a CEO become more opportunistic and thus manages earnings upwards.
2.3 CEO career horizon and earnings quality in family-controlled firms
The discussion so far has focussed on the likely consequences of the CH problem on ERN in
family-controlled firms, considering family-controlled firms to be emotionally oriented
businesses that may focus more on their non-economic goals. Prior literature concerning the
CH problem has focused primarily on non-family controlled firms (Strike et al., 2015). This
current study argues that the CH problem should be re-examined in family-controlled firms,
because such firms have a unique ownership structure and face challenges that differentiate
them from other firms. The existing literature on the CH problem suggests that a CEO
nearing retirement is most likely to have a short-investment horizon, which maximises his/
her wealth. This problem has been shown to affect the quality of financial reports. For
instance, Ali and Zhang (2015) reported that CEOs, both those about to retire and especially
those recently appointed, manage earnings upwards. Similarly, Chen et al. (2018) found that
firms become less conservative in their financial reporting when CEOs are nearing
retirement. In contrast, Pourciau (1993) and Wells (2002) could not establish that the CH
problem existed in their sampled firms. All of the studies cited examined the CH problem
through the lens of the agency theory in non-family companies.
According to the SEW theory, a family-controlled firm has significant non-economic
goals. The desire to protect the family’s SEW and perpetuate the family business beyond the
current generation takes priority over economic goals (Berrone et al., 2012). The concern of a
family-controlled firm for protecting its SEW is not directly targeted towards heightened
agency problems or negatively affecting the firm’s performance (Chrisman et al., 2004).
However, when the SEW is threatened, family-controlled firms will give priority to actions
that preserve their SEW, even when such actions do not align with the interests of other
stakeholders (Stockmans et al., 2010).
Consistent with the SEW theory, this current study argues that the CEOs of family-
controlled firms, regardless of the stage they are at in their careers (early or near retirement),
are more inclined to reduce agency costs and promote a culture of good stewardship by
making investments with long-term horizons, which will enhance the firm’s SEW. A primary





the benefit of family members. The CEO must be able to sustain family wealth, secure future
career opportunities and improve the welfare of future generations (Strike et al., 2015). Also,
the close monitoring exercised by the controlling owners of family firms (due to their
involvement in management and their better understanding of the business) reduces the risk
of the CEOs of such firms, who are approaching retirement, distorting earnings for their own
benefit (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014). Therefore, because the CH problem creates agency costs,
which could have a negative impact on a family-controlled firm, principals in family firms are
likely to discourage the manipulative tendencies of retiring CEOs by strict monitoring.
Therefore, the present study hypothesises that:
H1. The CEO career horizon problem is related to earnings quality.
2.4 Heterogeneity within family-controlled firms
By extending H1, this study argues that the extent of CEO commitment and the importance
placed on perpetuating the family business are influenced by specific CEO attributes which
might, in turn, determine the degree of the CH problem. For instance, the position of CEO in a
family-controlled firm is available to both family and non-family members. It was shown by
(Chrisman and Patel, 2012) that family-affiliated CEOs place more importance on their firm’s
culture, strategic vision, values and goals that will sustain and build the business for future
generations. A family-affiliated CEO possesses executive power combined with control by
ownership. The satisfaction derived from such power and control motivates family-affiliated
CEOs to be strongly committed to building a good reputation, protecting family wealth and
leaving a good legacy for future generations (Stockmans et al., 2010). Owing to this
heightened commitment, a family-affiliated CEO makes long-term, strategic decisions that
contribute to the SEW of the business. Therefore, this current study argues that, because
consideration of SEW influences the decisions of family-affiliated CEOs, the latter have a
greater incentive to produce quality reports of earnings. This is because the reputation of a
family business in the capital market is affected by the quality of its reported earnings.
Likewise, the agency problem, which arises as a result of the separation of control and
ownership, is mostly absent when CEOs have family affiliation, and so there are fewer
incentives to distort earnings. Furthermore, family-affiliated CEOs are less likely to be faced
with short tenure, income instability and job insecurity after retirement.
Therefore, this study proposes that, in a family firm when the CEO has an affiliation with
familymembers, the SEW (and especially family reputation) ismore important thanwhen the
CEO is not a family member. Therefore, family-affiliated CEOs are more concerned about the
quality of reported earnings than are CEOs from outside the family, that is:
H2a. The effect of the career horizon problem on earnings quality will be weaker in
family firms managed by CEOs who are affiliated with the family than in firms
managed by non-family CEOs.
Cognitive skills, experience and qualifications are the essential factors considered by the
nominating committee during the selection of directors, as recommended by a code of
corporate governance. A CEO’s expertise in business, accounting and finance enables him/
her to make professionally sound judgements. Making good decisions on business and
financial issues will enhance the CEO’s reputation in the CEO labour market. DeFond et al.
(2005) reported an association between market reaction and the appointment of
professionally qualified CEOs. Likewise, Hillman et al. (2000) found that, compared to
inexperienced CEOs, highly experienced CEOs were better at monitoring the performance of
the business. This current study argues that financially experienced CEOs are more
motivated than inexperienced CEOs to pursue a long-term investment horizon, at both the




due to the implications of such distortions on their reputation and credibility in the labour
market. So:
H2b. The effect of the career horizon problem on earnings quality will be weaker in
family firms managed by CEOs with financial expertise than in those managed by
CEOs without financial expertise.
Equity participation by a CEO in family-controlled firms further leads the CEO to perpetuate
the family dynasty and transgenerational aspirations and to invest in activities that increase
the value of the family business, because his/her wealth is tied to these investments. The
higher the CEO equity stake in the company, the stronger the incentive to be more committed
to the family business vision. This argument is consistent with the tenet of the agency theory
that managerial ownership merges the interests of both principal and agent. So:
H2c. The effect of the career horizon problem on earnings quality will be weaker in firms
managed by CEOs who have equity participation than in those managed by CEOs
without equity participation.
Furthermore, the literature regarding the CH problem suggests that sound corporate
governance mechanisms (internal or external) could ameliorate its effects on ERN. Chen et al.
(2018) showed that strong corporate governance mitigates the CH problem. Notably, Huson
et al. (2011) reported that effective and efficient compensation committees prevented the CH
problem in firms by adjusting the compensation schemes of CEOs nearing retirement.
Therefore, by engaging the service of reputable auditors, the CH problem can be mitigated.
Although consistent with the agency view, the motivation behind demanding a quality audit
is the need to reduce agency conflicts. However, the SEW theory posits that the primary
incentives in family-owned firms are the preservation and perpetuation of the family dynasty.
In alignment with a firm’s SEW, a family-controlled business may hire a reputable auditor as
a signal of credible financial information, in exchange for a better reputation in the capital
market (Ho and Kang, 2013). Reputable auditors are noted for their non-comprising stands on
the quality of reported figures (DeFond and Zhang, 2014). Sound monitoring by a reputable
auditor would further enhance the identity and reputation of a family-controlled firm, which
is an essential aspect of SEW. So:
H2d. The effect of the career horizon problem on earnings quality will be weaker in
family firms that engage reputable auditors than in those who engage non-
reputable auditors.
3. Research methodology
3.1 Sample selection and data
The sample of the study comprised selected family owned/controlled companies that were
listed on the Bursa Malaysia during the period of 2005–2016 and for which the required data
were available for the sample period. The stratified sampling technique was adopted for the
sample selection. Based on market capitalisation, companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia
were divided into three strata: (1) uppermarket capitalisation, (2) middle capitalisation and (3)
bottom market capitalisation. Then, 63 companies were randomly selected from the top and
middle strata, and 64 companies were selected from the bottom stratum. The justification for
using stratified sampling is that it is a probability sampling technique which gives all the
member of the population to have an equal chance of being selected in the sample to avoid
sample selection bias (Michelon and Parbonetti, 2012). Therefore, the selected sample is based
on the stratification of listed firms’ according to market capitalisation to enhance the





Data on CEO age, audit firm, CEO family affiliation, CEO financial experience and CEO
equity were collected from the annual reports. Financial data were gathered from the
Thomson Financial DataStream Advance. Consistent with extant studies on ERN quality,
family-owned companies operating in the financial sector were excluded, because that sector
is more regulated and has a different reporting format. Although the data required for the
study were from the period of 2005 to 2016, 2004 and 2017 were included to measure the
quality of reported earnings. Thus, only companies that had a complete data set during 2004–
2017 were included. The final sample comprised 2,112 observations from 190 family-owned
companies. The sample distributions according to sector and year are presented in Tables 1
and 2.
3.2 Measurement of variables
3.2.1 Measurement of ERN. In this study, ERN is defined using two of the characteristics
expected of high-quality earnings. First, ERN is defined in terms of persistence and
sustainability, as shown in previous studies (Atwood et al., 2010; Ye et al., 2010). High-quality
earnings should reveal the permanence of earnings, sustained over a long period. Second,
ERN is defined in terms of its predictability, that is, the ability of earnings to predict future
operating cash flow (Barragato andMarkelevich, 2008). This definition of ERN suggests that
reported figures should enable the evaluation of the amounts, timing and uncertainties of
future cash flow (Barragato and Markelevich, 2008).
Industry Freq. Per cent
Construction 146 6.91
Consumer Products & Services 452 21.4




Telecommunications & Media 44 2.08
Transportation & Logistics 57 2.7
Utilities 66 3.12
Total 2,112 100























3.2.2 Family firm identification. Several criteria have been used in extant studies to
identify and define family firms. For example, Chau and Gray (2010) defined a family firm
based on the percentage of shares held by founding families and their relatives, as well as
management. Strike et al. (2015) defined family firms as ones in which at least two family
members are directors, and a family member owns at least 5% of the shares. The present
study uses the definition of Amran and Che-Ahmad (2009), that is: (1) if the CEO is the
founder/successor or a relative of the founder or (2) the presence of a family member on board
or (3) if a family owns at least 10% of all shares.
3.2.3 CEO career horizon. Consistent with Strike et al. (2015), CHwas estimated for each of
the CEOs by obtaining their current age from each company’s annual report and then taking
75 years as the age of retirement because, according to the Malaysian Companies Act 1965,
directors above the age of 70 are prohibited from serving in any public company or subsidiary
(Amran et al., 2014). The additional five years allow for subsequent years of service on
the board.
3.2.4 Other variables. Four other variables were employed to identify the differences
between firms: (1) CEO family member affiliation (FMA) was tested by using a dummy
variable set to 1 for CEOs that were affiliated to family members, and set to 0 if otherwise. (2)
CEO equity stake (CES) was the percentage of the shares held in the name of the CEO. (3) For
CEO experience (CE), using information retrieved from the background information provided
in the director’s profile, a dummy variable was set to 1 to code firms whose CEO had a
financial/business background, and set to 0 if otherwise. (4) For audit quality (AQ), a dummy
variable set to 1 was used to code firms that engaged the services of any “Big 4” audit firm,
and set to 0 if otherwise.
3.2.5 Control variables. Following Al-dhamari et al. (2012), this study utilised three
additional control variables: (1) firm size (SIZE) was measured as the log of total assets. (2)
Leverage (LEV), which captures the tightness of debt constraint, wasmeasured as the ratio of
total debt to total assets. (3) Reporting negative earnings (LOSS) was a dummy variable that
was set to 1 if a firm reported negative earnings at the end of the financial year, and if
otherwise was set to 0.
3.3 Model specification and estimation techniques
This study predicted that family-controlled firms will have higher ERN after taking into
consideration the CEO CH under the SEW theory. Two proxies of ERN were employed
in this study: earnings persistence and predictability of cash flow. The ability of
earnings to predict future cash flows was measured as the coefficient from a regression
of cash flow from operating activities one-period ahead. Similarly, the study estimated
earnings persistence as the coefficient of current period earnings, defined as net income
as one year ahead before extraordinary items and scaled by the total assets at the
beginning. The cash flow model contained in section 3.3.1, together with the earnings
predictability model contained in section 3.3.2, was used to investigate the effect of the
CH problem on ERN. The twostep system general method of moment (GMM) estimation
technique, introduced by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), was
employed because it controls unobservable heterogeneity, simultaneity and the influence
of past performance on the present firm’s decisions (Wintoki et al., 2012). The GMM
estimation technique is an efficient estimator of data, because it creates the first
difference of all variables and estimates the data using the lagged values of the right-
hand side variables (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). The lagged
values of the right-hand side variables remove the unobserved effect and are orthogonal
to error terms. All variables in the earning predictability model and the earning





3.3.1 Earnings predictability model.
CFOitþ1 ¼ αERNit þ β1CH  ERNit þ β2CH  FMA  ERNit þ β3CH  CE  ERNit
þβ4CH  CES  ERNit þ β5CH  AQ  ERNit þ β6AQ  ERNit þ β7CES  ERNit
þβ8FMA  ERNit þ β9CE  ERNit þ β10SIZE  ERNit þ β11LEV  ERNit
þβ12LOSS  ERNit þ β13YEARCONTROLþ εit
(1)
3.3.2 Earning persistence model.
ERNitþ1 ¼ αERNit þ β1CH  ERNit þ β2CH  FMA  ERNit þ β3CH  CE  ERNit
þβ4CH  CES  ERNit þ β5CH  AQ  ERNit þ β6AQ  ERNit þ β7CES  ERNit
þβ8FMA  ERNit þ β9CE  ERNit þ β10SIZE  ERNit þ β11LEV  ERNit
þβ12LOSS  ERNit þ β13YEARCONTROLþ εit
(2)
Variable Definition
CFOitþ1 Operating cash flow scaled by the beginning of total assets
ERNitþ1 One-year-ahead net income before extra-ordinary items scaled by the beginning total
asset
ERNit Current year net income before extra-ordinary items scaled by the beginning total asset
CH CEO career horizon
CES CEO equity participation
CE CEO experience
AQ Quality differentiated auditor (Big 4 and non-Big 4)
SIZE Natural log of total asset




Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Panel A: Distribution of continuous variables
CFOtþ1 0.094 0.607 0.631 16.142
ERNtþ1 0.046 0.280 3.017 11.060
ERN 0.049 0.464 5.634 14.675
CH 18.948 10 21 44
CES 1.073 5 0 45.47
SIZE 13.23 1.53 9.37 18.45
LEV 0.234 0.360 0 10.180
Panel B: Distribution of dummy variables
AQ 0.651 0.452 0 1
FMF 0.443 0.362 0 1
CE 0.286 0.452 0 1











4. Presentation of findings
4.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix
Table 4 reports the summary statistics for earnings predictability, earnings persistence,
independent variables and other control variables. The panel data comprise 2,112
observations for family companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia from 2005 to 2016. Panel
A inTable 4 shows the descriptive statistics of the continuous variables, and panel B presents
the descriptive statistics for all the dummy variables employed in the study. The mean
(median) of CFOtþ1 was 0.094 (0.607), which shows that average earnings predictability is
positive. For ERNtþ1, the average earnings persistence was positive with a mean value of
0.046 and amedian value of 0.280. Likewise, mean CHwas 18.948, and ranged from21 to 44
service years (the negative sign indicates those CEOs that spent more years as CEO above the
statutory requirement). On average, CES was 1.073, with a maximum value of 45.47%. The
average value of SIZE was 13.23, with values ranging from 9.37 to 18.45 (log value), while the
average debt was 803,402. As revealed in panel B of Table 1, AQ was 65% and FMA was
44%. The value of CE was 28%, and that of LOSS was 16% (See Table 4).
Table 5 reports the correlation analysis between earnings predictability, earnings
persistence, CEO horizon and other control variables (except for the year dummies). A
correlation coefficient of more than 0.7 was considered by Pallant (2007) to indicate a severe
multicollinearity problem among the independent variables. No correlation coefficient was
more than 0.7.
4.2 Multivariate regression analysis
Table 6 reports the regression results between CH, earnings predictability and earnings
persistence, together with control variables (estimation of equation 1). The dependent
variable ERN is measured by earnings predictability (i.e. cash flows one-year ahead). The
interactions that were examinedwere of CHwith: audit quality (CH*AQ*ERN); CEO financial
expertise (CH*CE*ERN); CEO equity stake (CH*CES*ERN); and CEO family affiliation
(CH*FMA*ERN).
The GMM estimation technique was chosen due to the need to control for endogeneity
arising from a previous year’s performance. Further, the GMM techniquemitigates the biases
associated with the static panel. The result of the Arellano–Bond (AR2) second-order
correlation in themodel 2 shows a positive p-value of 0.33 and 0.47, respectively. Accordingly,
the null hypothesis of no second-order correlation cannot be rejected. Therefore, the two
models are free from autocorrelation problems.
From the GMM result reported in Table 6, the estimated coefficient on ERNt is significant
at the 0.01 level: this suggests that the current earnings reported by listed family-controlled
companies in Malaysia can be used to predict future cash flow. This result is in agreement
with the work of Atwood et al. (2010), which documented a significant relationship between
earnings and cash flows in the following year.
To test hypothesis 1, the effect of CH on ERN, measured by earnings predictability, was
investigated and reported in Table 4, model 1. For CH*ERN, CH had a significant negative
effect on one-year-ahead cash flows (β 5 0.204; p < 0.05). This result suggests that the CH
problem in a family-controlled firm could distort the predictive ability of future cash flows.
However, when the nature of family involvement and other firm characteristics were included
in model 2 (as reported in Table 6), the coefficient and sign of CH*ERN changed, which
indicates the effect of the interaction. This suggests that a family firm’s heterogeneity could
reverse the CH problem.
Moving to the second set of hypotheses, FMA and CES were investigated. Likewise, CE
and AQwere investigated further to see if they could reverse (mitigate) the negative effect of























































































































































































































































firms whose CEO was related to either the founder or family members with substantial
shareholdings or related to other board members.
Accordingly, hypothesis 2a was tested by the estimation of equation CH*FMA*ERN. In
model 2 (Table 4), the study found a statistically significant impact in the opposite direction
(β5 0.448; p< 0.01). This result suggests that, for family-controlled firms in which the CEO is
nearing retirement, FMA moderates the effect of the CH problem. Therefore, the conclusion
can be safely made that the interaction of FMA with CH significantly predicts future
cash flows.
Further, hypothesis 2b was tested by investigating the interaction of CH*CE*ERN.
According to the estimates result in Table 4 under model 2, the coefficient of CH*CE*ERN is
positive, but not significantly related to future cash flows (0.123; p > 0.10). This result
indicates that CE could mitigate the effect of CH on earnings predictability, because CE is
negatively significant in model 1 without interaction.
Hypothesis 2c was tested by investigating the effect of CEO equity participation on CH
through the interaction of CH*CES*ERN. Unlike the findings in previously interacted
variables, the coefficient on CH*CES*ERN (β 5 0.354 p < 0.10) significantly moderated the
effect of CH on the predictive ability of current earnings.
Also, hypothesis 2d was tested by investigating the interaction of CH*AQ*ERN. The
result showed that the appointment of a reputable auditor does not reverse the CH problem.
As shown in Table 4, the estimated result revealed a statistically significant but negative
effect (β 5 0.013; p < 0.01), which suggests that auditors pay less attention to the CH
problem. As for the control variables, SIZE is positive and significantly associated with one-
year-ahead cash flows (β 5 0.161; p < 0.01). However, the coefficient on LEV is significantly
Model 1 Model 2
Dependent variable: CFOtþ1 Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
_cons 0.029 1.70* 0.161 2.77***
L1.CFOtþ1 0.548 60.23
*** 0.729 28.16***
ERNt 0.01 7.39*** 0.037 2.64***
SIZE*ERN 0.306 0.49 0.479 3.46***
LEV*ERN 0.112 0.58 0.948 2.7***
LOSS*ERN 0.157 0.76 0.769 0.17
AQ*ERN 0.511 2.2*** 0.173 2.4***
CES*ERN 0.107 1.55* 0.108 0.37
FMF*ERN 0.565 3.29*** 0.640 0.82
CE*ERN 0.519 2.96*** 0.509 2.66***
CH 0.119 0.15 0.006 1.73**






Significant F 0.000 0.000
AR1 0.04 0.05
AR2 0.33 0.47
Pooled observation 2,112 2,112
Note(s): The t-values are in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05 and *p < 0.1. “Included” in the year dummy
column indicates that study control for year effect. However, the result was not reported consistent with
previous studies (Chen et al., 2018). The L1.CFOtþ1 is the lagged value of the dependent variable which is











negative (β50.479; p < 0.01), which indicates that a firm’s debt has predictive ability. The
findings partly suggest that debt providers provide strict monitoring to discourage
opportunistic report. LOSS, on the other hand, does not have any significant relationshipwith
the predictive ability of earnings.
Table 7 contains the results of the earnings persistencemodel. The variables of interest are
the same as those used in the earnings predictability model. The dependent variable is
earnings one-year ahead. The variables of interest are CH and its interaction with the
identified family firm heterogeneous variables. These interacted variables include: audit
quality (CH*AQ*ERN); financial expertise (CH*CE*ERN); equity participation
(CH*CES*ERN); and family affiliation (CH*FMA*ERN). Table 7 contains the GMM
estimation results for the earnings persistence model. As shown in Table 5, the estimated
coefficient on ERN is significant in both model 1 and model 2. This indicates the predictive
power of earnings of family-controlled firms in Malaysia to evaluate the sustainability of
earnings in the future.
Hypothesis 1 examined the effect of CH on earnings persistence (CH*ERN). In model 1, the
result revealed that the coefficient on CH*ERN is negative and significant (β 5 0.163;
p< 0.001). The result indicates that, as a CEO of a family-controlled firm nears retirement, the
firm is less likely able to sustain its earnings. However, after the interaction of family firm
heterogeneous variables, the coefficient on CH*ERN turned positive (β 5 0.149; p < 0.001).
Similarly, as contained in Table 7, model 2, the interaction of CEO family member
affiliation with CH (CH*FMA*ERN) in hypothesis 2a revealed that CEO family member
affiliation significantly reversed the CH problem, with an estimated coefficient of 0.134
(p < 0.0001). Therefore, the result suggests that the quality of earnings is not distorted when
the CEO is related to controlling owners in family-controlled firms. However, the interaction
Model 1 Model 2
Dependent variable: ERNtþ1 Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Constant 0.034 3.18*** 0.219 3.52***
L1.ERNtþ1 0.151 13.45*** 0.030 3.17***
ERNt 0.003 1.08 0.035 3.75***
SIZE*ERN 0.207 4.14*** 0.544 3.44***
LEV*ERN 0.255 0.29 0.928 3.73***
LOSS*ERN 0.119 8.26*** 0.173 4.14***
AQ*ERN 0.769 11.56*** 0.251 3.06***
CES*ERN 0.265 2.4*** 0.492 2.49***
FMF*ERN 0.923 5.51*** 0.183 4.24***
CE*ERN 0.654 4.4*** 0.194 3.66***
CH 0.127 2.82*** 0.616 1.91**





Year dummy Included Included
Significant F 0.000 0.000
AR1 0.077 0.024
AR2 0.908 0.300
Pooled observation 2,112 2,112
Note(s): The t-values are in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05 and *p < 0.1. “Included” in the year dummy
column indicates the study control for year effect. However, the result was not reported consistent with
previous studies (Chen et al., 2018). The L1.CFOtþ1 is the lagged value of the dependent variable that is










of CH and CEO experience (CH*CE*ERN) does not have a significant effect on the CH
problem (β50.477; p> 0.010). The implication is that CEO experience could not reverse the
CH problem in family firms under the earning persistence model. On the contrary, the
interaction of CEO equity shares and CH (CH*CES*ERN) is positive and significant
(β5 0.251; p<0.01), suggesting that CEO equity ownership significantlymoderates the effect
of the CH problem. The results indicate that a CEOwith equity participation gives priority to
the SEWof family firms and, therefore, on their ability to sustain their earnings. However, the
interaction of the quality of auditor on the CH problem (CH*AQ*ERN) indicated that the type
of auditor does not reverse the CH problem (β50.208; p< 0.01). With respect to the control
variables, SIZE was significantly and positively associated with earnings sustainability
(β 5 0.544; p < 0.01), while the coefficient on LEV was significant and positive (β 5 0.928;
p < 0.01). LOSS was negative and significant with earnings sustainability
(β 5 0.173; p < 0.01).
5. Additional tests
5.1 Robustness checks on the career horizon problem
This study extends and investigates further the robustness of the results by re-estimating
Equations (1) and (2) for a subsample of companies with CEO retirement in a specific year
during the sampled years. Examining this subsample provides the opportunity of comparing
ERN in the pre and post CEO retirement period. Accordingly, the sample for estimating the
equation reduces from 2,112 to 842 firm-years observations. Consistent with Chen et al. (2018),
only firms that existed in both year t1 and year tþ1 were used in the analysis to ensure
comparability in the sample composition. RE is a dummy variable that equals 1 for years
before CEO departure and 0 for subsequent years after CEO departure. RE further interacted
with the identified family-firm heterogeneous variables [ i.e. family affiliated CEO
(RE*FMA*ERN), audit quality (RE*AQ*ERN), CEO financial experience (RE*CE*ERN)
and CEO equity stake (RE*CES*ERN)]. The coefficient on RE*ERN measures the difference
between the reporting quality in the pre CEO change period and the post CEO change period
for firms with a retiring CEO.
Table 8, which contains the results of the sensitivity analysis, shows that the coefficient of
a CEO’s CH (CH*ERN) in the earnings predictability model (β5 4.339; p< 0.01) and earnings
sustainability model (β 5 4.283; p < 0.01) is positively significant for firms with CEO
departure. The result further confirms the priority given to SEW in family firms, which
makes them behave distinctively. Although firms with a family affiliated CEO
(RE*FMA*ERN) have a weak reporting quality, the coefficient on RE*AQ*ERN indicates
a reliable reporting quality for a family firm with differentiated reputable audit before CEO
departure. This indicates that, even though the affiliation of the CEO with a family member
could not reverse the CH problem during the final years of CEO departure, the use of a
reputable auditor did.
6. Summary and conclusions
The objective of this study was to investigate the relationship between CEO CH and earnings
quality and the moderating impact of CEO characteristics and audit quality on the
association between CEO CH and earnings quality among selected family-controlled firms in
Malaysia. The study used a sample of 190 family-controlled companies listed on Bursa
Malaysia over the period from 2005 to 2016, with a total of 2,112 firm-year observations.
Earnings predictability and earnings persistence were the two measures of earnings
quality adopted in this study. Family-controlled companies were defined as those where
family members owned more than 10% of the firm’s outstanding shares and at least two
family members were directors. The primary explanatory variable used in this study was





employed a GMM regression estimation technique to investigate the hypotheses. Likewise,
year dummies were introduced to control for year fixed effects.
This study found that the reported earnings of family-controlled firms, with a CEO
nearing retirement, suffered from the inability of current cash flow to predict future cash flow
and unsustainable earnings. This finding is consistent with the argument that a retiring CEO
could manipulate reported earnings to favour their post-retirement benefits (Ali and Zhang,
2015; Chen et al., 2018). However, by considering the interaction between CEO CH, the
characteristics of the firm and CEO, as well as audit quality, the study found that a family-
affiliated CEO, a CEO with financial expertise, and an auditor of good quality moderate the
relationship between CEO career horizon and earnings quality. The findings further validate
the argument that family-affiliated CEOs overvalue a firm’s culture, strategic vision, values
and goals aimed at building a family heritage and transgenerational goals (Chrisman and
Patel, 2012). Accordingly, CEOs with family affiliation have greater incentive to build a
reputation, protect family wealth and leave a good legacy for future generations (Stockmans
et al., 2010). Given this, they have a strong desire to produce high-quality earnings. Further,
the study confirmed that a highly experienced CEOprovides bettermonitoring (DeFond et al.,
2005; Hillman et al., 2000), thus leading to the reversal of the CEO CH problem in firms with a
financially experienced CEO. This study also found that the choice of a reputable auditor
reversed the CEO CH problem in family-controlled firms, consistent with prior studies
(DeFond and Zhang, 2014; Ho and Kang, 2013)
The present study argued and found support for the posited hypotheses that the CEO CH
problem differs between family firms, and it found that the interaction between a CEO’s CH
and family firms’ heterogeneity moderates the result. Therefore, the study offers a theoretical
Model 1 Model 2
Dependent variable: CFOtþ1 Dependent variable: ERN tþ1
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Constant 0.034 1.2 0.021 1.02
L1.ERNtþ1 0.533 4.31
*** 0.546 3.74***
ERNt 0.075 5.49*** 0.025 5.77***
SIZE*ERN 0.641 0.76 0.015 2.47***
LEV*ERN 0.653 1.22 0.177 0.46
LOSS*ERN 0.666 0.17 0.243 0.63
AQ*ERN 0.441 2.75*** 0.237 1.93**
CES*ERN 0.388 2.4*** 0.593 0.85
FMF*ERN 0.128 3.69*** 0.251 1.05
CE*ERN 0.652 1.39 0.044 0.14
CH 0.121 1.96* 0.108 3.27***
RE*ERN 4.339 2.42*** 4.283 4.24***
RE*FMF*ERN 1.349 5.31*** 0.486 3.96***
RE*CE*ERN 1.417 2.22*** 0.413 0.75
RE*CES*ERN 0.017 0.57 0.0140 0.7
RE*AQ*ERN 0.326 9.25*** 0.113 5.12***
Year dummy Included Included
Significant F 0.000 0.000
AR1 0.003 0.668
AR2 0.594 0.300
Pooled observation 842 842
Note(s): The t-values are in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05 and *p < 0.1. “Included” in the year dummy
column indicates the study control for year effect. However, the result was not reported consistent with
previous studies (Chen et al., 2018). The L1.CFOtþ1 is the lagged value of the dependent variable, which is







contribution to research in the area of family firm reporting incentives, and hence, it improves
our understanding of the CEO CH problem. Research into financial reporting in family firms
predominantly uses the agency theory to explain the reporting incentive of family firms.
Existing studies portray family firms as having a weak reporting incentive. Accordingly, a
CEOnearing retirement couldmanipulate reported earnings to favour his/her post-retirement
benefits. Past studies have failed to consider the peculiar nature of family firms in the reversal
of the CEO CH problem.
The findings of the present study have practical implications for family firms and
regulatory authorities. The differences established among family firms could serve as a basis
for future policy and regulatory pronouncements on family firms. Findings from the current
study highlighted the reporting incentives of firms controlled by affiliated family CEOs and
non-affiliated family CEOs nearing retirement: therefore, policymakers, investors, creditors and
financial statement analysts are better informed about their choice of investment. Furthermore,
as previously argued in the past literature developed on agency theory, family involvement in
the business process can lead to a positive outcome and not necessary as argued by the agency
theorist. Accordingly, the findings draw the attention of policymakers to the SEW view that
non-financial goals drive family firms: hence, they can guide future regulations.
A few limitations of the present study are worthy of mention. First, the country in focus
was Malaysia. Even though Malaysia presents a unique institutional setting, due to the high
proportion of family-controlled firms, the results may not be equally applicable to those
countries with similar regulatory and institutional environments. Second, among the several
proxies available formeasuring earnings quality, the present study drew its conclusions from
just twomeasures: earnings predictability and the earnings persistence model. Therefore, the
results must be interpreted within the context of the earnings quality measures used in this
study. Different proxies might produce different and inconsistent results because the
measure represents the different dimension of earnings quality. Third, the study included
family-controlled companies in the sample period. Accordingly, some selection bias might
have been unintentionally introduced during the sampling process. For instance, during the
12 years sampled, some of the companies were delisted whilst others received listing status,
resulting in an unbalanced panel of data. Thismight have introduced some level of bias in the
interpretation of the results.
The mentioned limitations provide an opportunity for future study. Future studies could
consider other measures of SEW, as proposed by (Berrone et al., 2012). Furthermore, other
measures of earnings quality can be considered, and the SEW framework as used in the
present study extended to other areas, such as auditing.
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